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Climate	 Agreement	 is	 either	 unattainable	 or	 far	 from	 the	 economic	 optimal	 according	 to	20	
William	Nordhaus1.	 Instead,	his	economic	analysis	 implies	a	climate	policy	path	that	 limits	21	
global	warming	to	3.5°C	by	the	end	of	the	century	and	decarbonizes	the	economy	only	in	the	22	
next	century.	According	to	Nordhaus,	this	reflects	the	economically	optimal	balance	between	23	
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which	 he	 created	 and	 developed	 in	 several	 steps4,5.	 The	model	 seeks	 to	 find	 the	 optimal	29	
emission,	 temperature	 and	 carbon	 tax	 trajectories	 by	 balancing	 the	 costs	 of	 emissions	30	
reductions	 and	 the	 damages	 of	 climate	 change,	 measured	 in	 economic	 terms.	 Emissions	31	





omission	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 the	 risk	 for	 climate	 catastrophes12-15,	 the	 treatment	 of	 non-37	
market	damages16,17,	and	details	of	its	climate	model18-20.	Notably	DICE’s	concept	of	economic	38	
optimality,	i.e.	maximizing	a	Discounted	Utilitarian	social	welfare	function,	has	been	criticized	39	
for	 not	 reflecting	 the	 structure	 of	 optimal-control	 models	 that	 incorporate	 risk	 and	40	











Specifically,	 our	 updates	 to	 the	 basic	 DICE	 parameters	 draw	 from	 the	 latest	 findings	 on	52	
economic	damage	 functions28,	which	Nordhaus1	 includes	 in	a	 sensitivity	analysis,	 together	53	
with	some	of	the	latest	climate	science29,30,	and	a	broad	range	of	expert	recommendations	54	
on	social	discount	rates24.	This	is	complemented	by	revised	assumptions	regarding	non-CO2	55	
greenhouse	 gas	 emissions31,	 the	 feasibility	 of	 negative	 emission	 technologies2,32,	 and	56	
constraints	 on	 the	 feasible	 speed	 of	 decarbonization2,33.	 While	 some	 of	 these	 individual	57	
updates	have	already	been	analyzed	 in	the	existing	 literature,	our	 innovation	 is	to	analyze	58	














We	 first	 update	 DICE	 by	 implementing	 the	 carbon	 cycle	module	 from	 the	 simple	 climate	72	
model	FAIR29,30.	This	module	takes	 into	account	how	the	removal	rate	of	atmospheric	CO2	73	










balance	 model	 in	 DICE	 and	 thus	 make	 its	 temperature	 dynamics	 consistent	 with	 recent	84	
climate	science.		85	
The	 climate	 sensitivity	 that	 determines	 the	 equilibrium	 temperature	 change	 for	 a	 given	86	
change	in	radiative	forcing	in	DICE	is	set	to	3.1°C	for	a	doubling	of	the	atmospheric	CO2	level5.	87	












social	 discount	 rate	 and	 the	 magnitude	 of	 economic	 damages	 incurred	 as	 temperatures	100	
increase.	 The	 damage	 function	 has	 proven	 difficult	 to	 estimate	 because	 of	 the	 joint	101	
uncertainties	of	physical	climatic	effects,	the	likely	socio-economic	responses	to	these	effects,	102	
and	the	economic	valuation	of	these	damages.	Since	the	first	attempts	to	estimate	economic	103	









updated	 damage	 function	 is	 closer	 to,	 yet	 still	 more	 conservative	 than,	 recent	 micro-112	
econometric	 studies47	 and	 expert	 elicitations	 on	 the	 topic48,49,	 which	 estimate	 damages	113	
upwards	of	around	10%	of	global	GDP	for	a	3°C	temperature	increase.	In	our	central	model,	114	
we	 do	 not	 change	 the	 functional	 form	 of	 the	 damage	 function,	 as	 in	 Weitzman12,50	 or	115	
Glanemann	et	al.51,	who	apply	the	damage	function	of	Burke	et	al.47,	but	rather	update	how	116	
damage	estimates	are	combined	to	calibrate	the	standard	DICE	damage	function.	When	using	117	






















the	 latest	 evidence	 on	 expert	 recommendations	 on	 the	 SDR.	Drupp	 et	 al.24	 surveyed	 173	140	












approaches	 have	 a	 theoretical	 justification	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 voting	 outcomes	 (see	152	
Methods),	and	hence	imagine	a	voting	solution	to	the	disagreement	on	the	SDR58-60	.		153	

















































The	 simple	 Ramsey	 rule	 (1)	 is	 used	 for	 project	 appraisal	 by	 a	 number	 of	 countries	 and	
organizations,	including	the	Fifth	Assessment	Report	of	the	IPCC38.	However,	the	rule	has	various	
extensions	that	experts	recommend24.	A	notable	class	of	extensions	relate	explicit	incorporations	
























within	 this	 century.	 Removing	 CO2	 from	 the	 atmosphere	 by	 Carbon	 Dioxide	 Removal	187	
technologies	such	as	Biomass	Energy	with	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage	(BECCS),	afforestation,	188	
and	Direct	Air	Capture	have	been	suggested	as	a	possible	critical	and	cost-effective	abatement	189	
option	to	 limit	climate	change2,35,66-68	 .	The	timing	of	 the	availability	of	negative	emissions	190	
technologies	and	their	potential	magnitude	are	under	debate69,70,	as	well	as	their	relation	to	191	









CO2	 emissions	 from	mid-century	 onwards	 instead	 of	 from	 next	mid-century.	 This	 update	201	
results	in	optimal	negative	emissions	of	18	GtCO2	per	year	in	2100	at	the	lower	95%	bound	of	202	
expert	 recommendations	 on	 the	 social	 discount	 rate.	 The	 emission	 pathways	 that	 are	203	
assessed	 in	 the	 IPCC	Special	Report	and	that	meet	 the	1.5°C	 level	by	2100	have	a	median	204	
emission	 level	 of	 -12	 GtCO2	 in	 2100,	 with	 a	 lower	 90%	 bound	 of	 -20	 GtCO2	 per	 year	 as	205	
estimated	 from	data	available	 in	 the	 Integrated	Assessment	Modelling	Consortium	(IAMC)	206	




Finally,	 DICE	 does	 not	 include	 constraints	 on	 the	 speed	 of	 emission	 reductions.	 Under	210	
Nordhaus’34	 calibration	 this	 is	 not	 a	 concern	 since	 emission	 reductions	 occur	 relatively	211	
gradually.	However,	in	our	updated	version	of	DICE,	the	optimal	policy	path	displays	very	fast	212	
rates	of	emission	reductions.	Yet,	there	are	practical	limitations	on	how	rapidly	a	transition	to	213	
a	 decarbonized	 world	 economy	 can	 be	 implemented73.	 Typically,	 these	 restrictions	 are	214	






unrealistic	 emission	 reduction	 jumps	 for	 the	 period	when	 negative	 emissions	 are	 feasible	221	
(2050	onwards),	we	limit	the	growth	rate	of	the	emissions	reduction	to	10%	of	the	previous	222	














DICE	 into	 account.	 Since	 individual	 disagreements	 on	 value	 judgments	 embodied	 in	 the	236	
discounting	 parameters	 may	 be	 largely	 irreducible76,77,	 we	 run	 the	 DICE	 model	 for	 each	237	
expert’s	view	on	the	two	discounting	parameters	to	obtain	95th	and	66th	percentile	ranges	of	238	



























incorporated	 into	 our	 updated	 DICE	model.	B-D	 also	 compare	 climate	 policy	 pathways	 implied	 by	265	
Nordhaus’	discounting	in	this	updated	DICE	(black	line)	to	those	resulting	from	the	median	expert’s	266	








on	the	 technological	environment	and	climate	constraints	 in	 the	updated	DICE,	32%	of	all	275	










range	 of	 expert’s	 recommendations	 on	 the	 pure	 rate	 of	 time	 preference	 and	 inequality	 aversion	286	
translates	 into	 the	 optimal	 temperature	 change	 by	 2100	 from	 1850-1900	 levels	 (A),	 the	 years	 to	287	






feasible	 speed	of	decarbonisation	 (feas).	 For	better	 visibility	of	 the	 changes,	we	only	depict	 the	66	293	
percentile	 ranges	 based	 on	 the	 different	 expert	 views	 on	 discounting	 parameters	 in	 the	 boxplots	294	
(Extended	Data	Fig.	10	shows	a	box-and-whiskers	plot	with	 the	95	percentile	 ranges).	The	 triangle	295	
indicates	the	optimal	path	that	is	consistent	with	the	Nordhaus34	choice	of	discount	parameters,	the	296	





expert	 view	 and	 decreases	 it	 for	 Nordhaus’	 parameter	 choices.	 For	 most	 discounting	302	
parameter	choices,	the	carbon	cycle	update	reduces	the	SCC	in	2020	and	delays	the	date	of	303	
decarbonization.	Recalibrating	the	energy	balance	model	reduces	the	optimal	temperature	304	
increase	 by	 2100	 and	 prolongs	 the	 time	 until	 optimal	 decarbonization	 for	 all	 discounting	305	
parameter	combinations.	This	reduces	the	cost	of	emitting	an	additional	ton	of	CO2	into	the	306	
atmosphere	for	the	current	generation.		307	
Updating	 economic	 damages	 increases	 the	 SCC	 in	 2020,	makes	 it	 optimal	 to	 decarbonize	308	
earlier,	 and	 results	 in	 a	 lower	 temperature	 change	by	 2100.	 Introducing	 a	 lower	 non-CO2	309	
forcing	 pathway	 leads	 to	 a	 further	 drop	 in	 optimal	 temperatures,	 increases	 the	 time	 to	310	
decarbonization	and	reduces	 the	SCC	 in	2020.	Allowing	 for	 the	availability	of	net	negative	311	








arises	 from	 the	 updates	 to	 the	 discounting	 parameters.	 The	 sensitivity	 to	 discounting	320	
assumptions	 exists	 irrespective	 of	 when	 they	 are	 introduced	 in	 the	 sequence	 of	 model	321	








damage	 exponents	 or	 overall	 higher	 damages47,50,51,78	 (see	 Methods	 and	 Fig.	 S3	 in	 the	329	
additional	Supplementary	Information).		330	








SCC	 that	 falls	with	 the	 carbon	 cycle	 and	 energy	 balance	 updates,	 and	 negative	 emissions	339	
technology,	and	rises	with	damage	and	social	discounting	updates.		340	
Although	we	have	made	a	number	of	modifications	to	DICE	 in	this	paper	we	have	made	a	341	
point	 of	 keeping	 the	 number	 of	 changes	 to	 a	 minimum.	 Indeed,	 there	 are	 many	 factors	342	
ignored	 in	 the	analysis	 that	 should	be	part	of	 a	more	 comprehensive	appraisal	 of	 climate	343	
policies.	 In	 addition	 to	 uncertainty,	 these	 include,	 tipping	 points,	 relative	 scarcity	 of	 non-344	
market	goods,	climate-induced	migration	and	consideration	of	a	host	of	alternative	ethical	345	
frameworks.	In	Box	2,	we	summarize	a	number	of	key	limitations	and	potential	extensions	346	





maximizes	 global	 well-being.	 Thus	 our	 analysis	 ignores	 crucial	 aspects	 of	 heterogeneity	 relating,	352	
among	 others,	 to	 regional	 and	 sub-regional	 differences	 in	 preferences,	 income	 levels,	 adaptive	353	
capacity	 and	damages.	Nordhaus	early	on	developed	a	 regionalized	version	of	DICE,	 called	RICE79,	354	
which	has	subsequently	been	employed80	and	extended	to	a	sub-regional	level81	to	study	the	effect	of	355	















affect	 the	 capital	 stock	and	 thus	growth	directly92-94.	 Finally,	 a	 considerable	 share	of	damages	will	370	
affect	 goods	 and	 services	 that	 are	 not	 traded	 on	 markets,	 such	 as	 environmental	 amenities,	371	
biodiversity	and	coral	 reefs45	 .	These	damages	 to	non-market	goods—and	their	associated	relative	372	
price	changes—should	be	explicitly	modeled	and	can	substantially	impact	optimal	climate	policy16,17	.		373	
Endogenous	 growth:	DICE	 assumes	 an	 exogenous	 decline	 in	 technological	 progress,	 yet	much	 of	374	
modern	 growth	 theory	 is	 concerned	 with	 endogenous	 channels	 of	 growth95-99.	 Furthermore,	375	
endogenous	 population	 change	 will	 likely	 not	 only	 impact	 resource	 demand	 but	 also	 affect	376	
innovation100,101.		377	
Abatement	cost	function:	The	abatement	function	in	DICE	is	calibrated	to	smooth	reduction	rates.	378	




case	 under	 perfect	 coordination74,102.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 scale	 effects	 and	 technical	 progress	 can	383	
considerably	reduce	abatement	costs	as	witnessed	 in	renewables	such	as	solar	and	wind	 in	recent	384	
years.	 Relatedly,	 the	 marginal	 abatement	 costs	 curve	 assumed	 in	 DICE	 could	 also	 be	 made	385	
endogenous,	such	as	to	feature	learning-by-doing	dynamics103.	386	
Alternative	ethical	frameworks:	DICE	builds	on	the	standard	consequentialist	Discounted	Utilitarian	387	
welfare	 function	 that	 still	 forms	 the	workhorse	model	 of	 the	 economic	 analysis	 of	 climate	 policy.	388	





We	 used	 recent	 findings	 from	 the	 literature	 to	 update	 several	 key	 parameters	 of	 the	394	
prominent	DICE	model	developed	by	Nobel	Laureate	William	Nordhaus.	Our	updated	DICE	395	
model	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 higher	 Paris	 temperature	 target,	 with	 an	 optimal	 temperature	396	
increase	of	2.0°C	by	2100,	even	with	Nordhaus’	assumptions	on	discounting1,34,	and	otherwise	397	
well	 below	 2°C	 towards	 1.5°C.	 Of	 course,	 the	 basic	 DICE	 model	 is	 deterministic.	 Under	398	
uncertainty,	to	ensure	the	maximum	temperature	increase	is	less	than	2°C	in	2100,	or	indeed	399	
to	hit	the	lower	1.5°C	UN	Target,	with	any	degree	of	certainty	(e.g.	in	95%	of	cases)	would	400	
require	 more	 stringent	 mitigation	 policies	 than	 the	 central,	 deterministic	 case	 presented	401	
here.			402	











model	 and	 a	 carbon	 price	 of	 around	US$	 40	 in	Nordhaus’	 original	 DICE	 calibration.	 Thus,	413	
carbon	prices	 resulting	 from	 the	majority	 of	 expert	 views	 in	 our	 updated	DICE	model	 are	414	






far	 exceed	 our	 two	median	 cases,	 with	more	 than	 $400	 per	 ton	 of	 CO2	 in	 Germany,	 for	421	
instance110.	 Although	 they	 are	 not	 labelled	 carbon	 taxes,	 these	 policies	 provide	 some	422	
perspective	on	what	could	be	possible.	423	
Yet	 these	 countries	 are	 the	 exception	 and	make	 up	 a	 small	 part	 of	 the	 global	 economy.	424	
Furthermore,	while	carbon	pricing	is	key	to	achieving	the	range	of	optimal	climate	targets	we	425	










concerns113,114.	 Perhaps	one	of	 the	 chief	 obstacles	 to	policy	 stems	 from	a	 straightforward	436	
resistance	to	higher	prices.	In	aviation,	for	instance,	long-haul	flights	may	double	in	price	if	a	437	
carbon	tax	of	$300	per	ton	of	CO2	were	levied.	438	
The	 UN	 Paris	 Agreement	 is	 an	 expression	 of	 the	 international	 view	 that	 rapid	 action	 is	439	
necessary	 to	 limit	 the	damages	caused	by	climate	change.	The	 IPCC	Special	Report	on	the	440	
1.5°C	target36	then	illustrated	the	measures	required	to	meet	the	agreed	limit	of	1.5oC.	In	this	441	
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M.A.D.,	M.C.F.,	 B.G.,	M.C.H.	 and	 F.N.	 conceived	 a	 study	 on	 DICE	 focusing	 on	 the	 role	 of	468	
discounting	and	the	damage	function	which	was	merged	with	parallel	work	on	the	role	of	the	469	
carbon	cycle,	the	energy	balance	model	and	non-CO2	forcers	in	DICE	developed	by	C.A.	and	470	
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dynamic	 optimization	 results	 presented	 in	 this	 paper.	 Note	 that	 since	we	 use	 a	 different	777	
numerical	optimization	solver	and	modeling	language	than	Nordhaus34,	our	numerical	results	778	
differ	 slightly.	 We	 provide	 the	 programming	 code	 and	 data	 in	 separate	 files.	 To	 ease	779	
comparability	 to	 Nordhaus’1,34	 figures,	 we	 present	 industrial	 emissions,	 the	 social	 cost	 of	780	




we	 summarize	 the	 updates	 to	 key	 climate	 and	 economics-related	 functional	 forms	 and	785	
parameters	leading	to	the	final	model	specification	presented	in	the	main	text.	The	resulting	786	
climate	policy	paths	that	we	present	in	Fig.	2	of	the	main	text	are	framed	in	terms	of	what	is	787	
intergenerationally	 optimal	 as	 reflected	 by	 value	 judgments	 on	 the	 rate	 of	 pure	 time	788	
preference	and	inequality	aversion.	Thus,	we	also	offer	a	more	detailed	perspective	on	the	789	
diverging	 views	 on	 discounting	 parameters,	 one	 of	 the	 key	 sensitivities	 in	 the	 economic	790	
analysis	of	climate	change.	As	a	third	step	we	analyze	how	each	of	the	updates	subsequently	791	
affect	climate	policy	paths	for	(i)	Nordhaus’	choice	of	discounting	parameters,	(ii)	the	median	792	




within	 the	 politically	 discussed	 range	 for	 carbon	 prices.	 Both	 the	 optimal	 date	 of	797	
decarbonization	 in	 the	 next	 century	 and	 the	 optimal	 atmospheric	 temperature	 change	 of	798	
3.5°C	by	2100,	rising	to	4°C	in	the	middle	of	the	next	century	are	far	outside	climate	policy	799	
pathways	that	are	consistent	with	the	UN	temperature	limits	of	2°C	and	1.5°C.	We	provide	800	







cycle.	 Earlier	 versions	 of	 the	 DICE	model	were	 calibrated	 to	 fit	 the	 short-run	 carbon	 cycle	808	
(primarily	the	first	100	years).	Because	the	new	model	is	in	part	designed	to	calculate	long-run	809	
trends,	such	as	the	impacts	on	the	melting	of	large	ice	sheets,	it	was	decided	to	change	the	810	







point	 in	 time	 in	the	future	depends	on	the	past	cumulative	emissions	of	CO2.	Roughly	the	817	





amount	 of	 cumulative	 CO2	 emissions	 that	 are	 compatible	 with	 the	 targets	 in	 the	 Paris	823	
Agreement.	Hence,	 given	 the	non-linearities	 in	 the	 carbon	 cycle	 and	 climate	 carbon	 cycle	824	
feedbacks,	the	standard	carbon	cycle	in	DICE	2016R2	underestimates	the	removal	of	CO2	from	825	
the	 atmosphere	 by	 the	 biosphere	 and	 ocean	 when	 assessing	 emission	 pathways	 with	826	
cumulative	 emissions	 considerably	 smaller	 than	 5000	 GtC.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 this,	 the	827	
concentration	and	thus	also	the	temperature	impact	of	each	ton	of	CO2	emitted	is	likely	to	be	828	
















the	 response	 in	state-of-the-art	climate	system	models37.	Since	 the	Energy	Balance	Model	845	
(EBM)	 in	 DICE	 is	 a	 two-box	 model	 it	 has	 two	 characteristic	 response	 time	 scales	 whose	846	
calibration	are	different	than	those	presented	in	Geoffroy	et	al.37.	The	rapid	response	(yearly	847	


































needed.	 However,	 the	 independence	 assumption	 can	 be	 questioned	 as	 several	 of	 the	881	
estimates	 come	 from	 the	 same	 limited	 circle	 of	 authors.	 The	 selected	 climate	 damage	882	
function	translates	a	temperature	increase	of	3°C	into	a	damage	of	2.12%	of	global	GDP.		883	
Howard	 and	 Sterner28	 provide	 an	 up-to-date	 meta-analysis	 of	 the	 temperature-damage	884	















be	 chosen	 based	 on	 both	 normative	 and	 positive	 considerations.	 Drupp	 et	 al.24	 have	899	
undertaken	 a	 large,	 representative	 survey	 of	 academics	 publishing	 in	 leading	 economics	900	
journals	who	have	specific	expertise	on	these	matters	to	determine	their	views	on	the	values	901	

























1),	 but	 deviate	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons24.	 These	 include	 project	 risk,	 uncertainty,	927	
environmental	scarcity,	effects	of	inequalities	within	generations	as	well	as	alternative	ethical	928	
	 28	
approaches	 (See	Box	2).	As	 the	mean	 (median)	 imputed	simple	Ramsey	 rule	 in	 the	expert	929	
survey	is	higher	than	the	recommended	mean	(median)	social	discount	rate,	these	extensions	930	


























availability	 of	 carbon	 removal	 technologies	 leading	 to	 net	 negative	 emissions.	 While	 the	957	
scenarios	considered	by	the	IPCC2,36	make	use	of	negative	emission	technologies	roughly	by	958	
the	 year	 2050,	 the	DICE	 2016R2	model	 assumes	 that	 this	will	 only	 be	 feasible	 from	2160	959	
onwards.	In	line	with	the	pathways	assessed	in	the	IPCC	report,	we	allow	for	the	possibility	of	960	






of	 -8.0	GtCO2	 per	 year	 and	a	 90%	 interval	 of	 -15	GtCO2	 per	 year	 to	 -0.70	GtCO2	 per	 year	967	
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We	 impose	 a	 set	 of	 constraints	 on	 the	 maximum	 rate	 of	 technologically	 feasible	974	
decarbonization.	These	conditions	allow	for	a	more	credible	study	of	low-emission	scenarios.	975	
The	main	 text	 contains	 all	 relevant	 information.	 In	 a	 next	 step,	 we	 present	 the	 resulting	976	






5	 shows	 how	 different	 positions	 on	 social	 discounting	 translate	 into	 plausible	 ranges	 of	983	
climate	policy	paths	in	DICE	2016R	with	the	new	updated	carbon	cycle.	984	










While	 Nordhaus’	 view	 on	 social	 discounting	 translates	 into	 3.27°C	 warming	 by	 2100,	 the	995	
median	expert	view	(median	paths)	leads	to	an	increase	in	temperature	of	2.43°C	(2.93°C)	by	996	


























Third,	 we	 add	 the	 updated	 temperature-damage	 relationship	 according	 to	 Howard	 and	1022	
Sterner28.	Extended	Data	Fig.	7	shows	how	different	positions	on	social	discounting	translate	1023	
into	 plausible	 ranges	 of	 climate	 policy	 paths	 in	 DICE	 2016R2	 with	 updated	 carbon	 cycle,	1024	
energy	balance	model	and	temperature-damage	relationship.	1025	























the	 standard	 damage	 function,	 but	 abstract	 from	 “catastrophic”	 climate	 damages.	 In	 the	1048	
following,	we	run	the	DICE	model	with	updated	carbon	cycle	and	energy	balance	model	with	1049	
the	Weitzman50	damage	function	calibrated	to	incorporate	damages	of	2.9%	(50%)	in	units	of	1050	
output	 for	 a	 temperature	 increase	 of	 3°C	 (6°C).	 Fig.	 S3	 in	 the	 additional	 Supporting	1051	
Information	 shows	 how	 different	 positions	 on	 social	 discounting	 translate	 into	 plausible	1052	
ranges	of	 climate	policy	paths	 in	DICE	2016R2	with	updated	carbon	cycle,	energy	balance	1053	
model	 and	 temperature-damage	 relationship	 as	 in	Weitzman50	 .	Overall,	 the	 results	 show	1054	
much	less	stringent	climate	policy	as	compared	to	the	case	with	the	Howard	and	Sterner28	1055	









paths	 in	 DICE	 2016R2	 with	 updated	 carbon	 cycle,	 energy	 balance	 model,	 temperature-1065	
damage	relationship	and	non-CO2	forcing.		1066	
The	 updated	 non-CO2	 forcing	 scenario	 reflects	 an	 improved	 management	 of	 non-CO2	1067	











While	Nordhaus’	 view	 on	 social	 discounting	 now	 for	 the	 first	 time	 translates	 into	 staying	1079	
below	the	2°C	temperature	target	(1.98°C	warming	by	2100),	the	median	expert	view	(median	1080	
paths)	leads	to	an	increase	in	temperature	of	1.44°C	(1.75°C)	by	2100.	In	the	95	(66)	percentile	1081	
range,	 the	 temperature	 increase	 in	 2100	 is	 2.68°C	 (2.21°C)	 at	 the	 upper	 end,	 and	 1.28°C	1082	
	 32	
(1.32°C)	at	the	lower	end.	For	the	first	time	the	1.5°C	temperature	target	by	2100	is	in	line	1083	
with	 optimal	 economic	 policy	 according	 to	 a	 third	 of	 the	 173	 expert	 views	 on	 social	1084	
discounting.	Three	quarters	of	all	model	runs	stay	below	2°C	by	2100.	1085	
Fifth,	 we	 make	 negative	 emissions	 technologies	 available	 in	 2050	 instead	 of	 2160	 in	1086	
DICE2016R2.	 Extended	 Data	 Fig.	 9	 shows	 how	 different	 positions	 on	 social	 discounting	1087	
translate	into	plausible	ranges	of	climate	policy	paths	in	DICE	2016R2	with	updated	carbon	1088	
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